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Aesthetic Responses and Works of Art 
by 
Arthur Danto 
After reading Viollet-le-Duc's late volume, Le massif de Mont Blanc, Ruskin 
commented with a wry twist on the French response to the Charge of the Light 
Brigade: C'est magnifigue, mais ce n'est la geologie. Indeed it was not geology: it 
was a visionary scheme for restoring Mont Blanc to what it must have lookedl like 
in its beginning grandeur. A kind of utopian nostalgia seems more and more to bave 
been the defining motif of the nineteenth century - the dark obverse of its faith in 
progress to a luminous future. And under this perspective Viollet-le-Duc, the great 
restorer of the gothic edifice, must be its most exemplary artist, even if in fact what 
he achieved was more what the nineteenth century believed the medieval 
architect believed was architectural and social integrity than what the med'ieval 
architect believed as such: whatever Viollet-le-Duc touched became plus gothigue 
gue la gothigue meme - which could scarcely have been true of la gothigue rrieme. 
Given then his admiration for The First Architect, it was an extravagant extension 
of his impulse to return ai monumental bit of nature to an imagined primordial 
majesty. So it is intriguing to imagine that he mi.ght have found his own good mad 
king Ludwig to subsidize ai hyper-wagnerian folly, spilling regiments of masons. and 
hod-carriers, surveyers and geologists across those vast slopes. And there it stands 
as it stood am eresten Tag! Or as Viollet-le-Duc supposed it must have stood. Violl­
et-le-Duc will have made a mountain out of a mountain, but even more strikingly, 
an artwork out of a peak. 
There are metaphysical as well as practical difficulties in juxtaposing stages 
of the same mountain, and hence in comparing Mont Blanc j eune with what we 
may as well name "Mont Blanc �-" But we can imagine them as indiscernible 
to whatever degr�e we wish. From the beginning of my inquiries in the philosophy 
of art, I have been obsessed with such paired cases where only one member of the 
couple is an a.rtwork. To be sure, there are theological views to which Viollet-le-Duc 
was hospitable, according to which God was an artist and Mont Blanc one of his 
masterpieces. But lets suppose this false: Mont Blanc is logically mute, however 
Viollet-le-Duc - and Ruskin - may have rhapsodized before It, but "Mont Blanc 
jeune" makes a statement about the grander aspects of nature. Viollet·le-Duc's 
magnificent conception gives us a dramatic opportunity to ponder a nice question, 
namely whether our responses, aesthetically speaking, would lbe the same to ob· 
jects which are outwardly exactly the same, though one is a work of art and the 
other a mere object, however spectacular. Such 8i question raises serious philosoph· 
ical questions, for should our responses differ - :and I shall argue that they must -
it will be extremely difficult to suppose that aesthetic response is at aJI like a t'orm 
of sense-perception; all the more so If our knowledge that one Is an artwork is what 
makes the difference in how we respond: for in that case aesthetic response must 
be conceptually mediated in ways it will be instructive to identify. 
That will mandate my strategy in the present paper. It seems reasonable to 
suppose that it our aesthetic response to an object is a mere Anschauung, then It 
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our Anschauung. of an object .! is A, our Anschauung of an objecl �should nol 
especially differ when� and .Y are, in e\·ery outward particular. indiscernible: for 
the content of our perceptions should be much the same if whatever meets the 
senses is the same in the two instances. Since it is possible to imagine an artwork 
and a mere object to be similar in every observable respect, and if our aesthetic 
responses to the two differ when we know one of them to be an artwork, tlhen it is 
reasonable to conclude that the difference in response must in part be a matter of 
the knowledge, and aesthetic response cannot accordingly always be a matter of 
mere Anschauung. Rather, aesthetic response will in part be a function of the con· 
cept(s) under which the object is perceived, and the beliefs appropriate to objects 
so conceived. 
If this is true, there is a consequence of perhaps even greater moment to us. 
Ir knowledge that something is an artwork makes a difference in the mode of aes· 
thetic response to an object - if there are di!ferential aesthetic responses to indis· 
cemible objects when one is an artwork and the other, say, a natural thing - then 
there would be a threat of circularity in any definition of art In which some refer· 
ence to aesthetic response was intended to play a defining tole. For it would not 
be just aesthetic response as such but a certain kind of aesthetic response which 
belonged to works of art in contrast with the kind which belongs to natural things, 
or to blase' arti!acts like Brillo boxes (when not works of art) - and we should have 
to be able to distinguish works of art from natural things or mere artifacts mo order 
to define the appropriate kind of response. Hence we could not use that kind of 
response to define the .concept of the work of  art. 
Anyway, aesthetic considerations have always been viewed as having a natural 
place in 1discussions of art, and this is as good a place as any to come to terms with 
this easy association. The question is whether aesthetic considerations belong to 
the definition of art. If they do not, then they simply will be among the things 
which go with the concept without pertaining to its logic, and not really more im· 
portant, philosophically, than countless other things, Ji ke preciousness or collect· 
ability, which have also been felt part of the practice if not of the concept of art. 
I 
An aesthetic condition has been deemed necessary in the definition of art 
formulated by George .Dickie in his influential discussion of the Institutional Theory 
of Art: a work of art is a "candidate for appreciation," a status conferred upon an 
artifact by what Dickie speaks of as "the art world" - an institutionally enfran· 
chised group of persons who serve, so to speak, as trustees for the generalized 
musee imaginaire, the occupants of which are the artworks of the world. "If some· 
thing cannot be appreciated," Dickie writes, "it cannot be a work of art." Dickie 
denies that he means specifically aesthetic appreciation, but he has been taken to 
mean just that by a prominent critic whose argument, if sound, has some meaning 
for us. It is that there are certain objects which cannot be appreciated, hence can· 
not be works of art by Dickie's own contrapositive formula. Hence the citizenry 
of the artworld is bounded by the constraints of appreciability and cannot by fiat 
declare just anything a work of art. So there are at least negative conditions on 
what a work of art can be, and this is evidently not as wholly an institutional 
matter as Dickie pretends. Presumably, unappreciable objects would be those which 
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would not support the claim that every object can be viewed practically or aesthe· 
ticalJy. These objects cannot be psychically distanced, and so the objection pertains 
to more than Professor Dickie's theory, and has in consequence a conspicuous phil· 
osophical importance. 
There nevertheless are two difficulties with this position as defended by 
Professor Tedi Cohen. The first i5 this. Among the objects alleged immune to aesthe­
tic appreciati.on, Cohen cites "ordinary thumbtacks, cheap white envelopes, the 
plastic Corks given at some drive-in restaurants" and most particularly in view of 
the importance accorded one of them in the conceptual history of recent art, 
"uJinals." Now I do not know whether the claim is that these cannot be appreciated, 
or simply cannot be appreciated favorably. Terms like "cheap:' "ordinary," "plas· 
tic" are expressions of distaste, and it is not clear that even by Dickie;s criterion, 
every object elavated to the stature of an artwork by the artworid must �Q facto 
be favorably appreciated. As a matter of textual fact, Dickie does say something 
Hke this: "I am saying that every work of art must have some m.inimal potential 
value or worthiness." But in fact aesthetic qualities compass, it s.eems to me, nega­
tive considerations: we are repelled, disgusted, even sickened by certain works of 
art. To restrict to the favorable cases the application of the epithet "work of art" 
would be parallel to regarding moral considerations as arising only with persons 
and actions which had some "minimal potential value or worthiness." And while 
there may indeed be good in everything, moral theory had better accommodate the 
swine, the wicked, the morally lazy, the bad, the evil, the revolting. So "apprecia· 
tion," if aesthetic at least, can be negative, and the very use of the adjectives he 
does use tells. us a lot about the way in which Professor Cohen appreciates throw· 
away forks, vulgar envelopes, and ordinary thumbtacks (in contrast with push· 
pins?). I should be astonished if negative aesthetic appreciation. entailed that the 
objects whlch elicited it could not be works of art. 
These questions can obviously not be settled without some discussion of aes­
thetic appreciation - or of appreciation tout court - but there is another and 
more damaging difficulty which would remain even if these questions were resolved 
in such a way as to leave Cohen's object.ion unshaken. Even were we to grant that 
an ordinary thumbtack could not be (aesthetically) appreciated (postively or neg­
atively) it would not follow that a thumbtack - or an ordinary white envelope -
or a plastic throwaway fork ,could not be a work of art. Of course a thumbtack 
which was a work of art would have to differ in� way from a thumbtack other­
wise like it in every external respect which was not a work of art. But In that case 
it is far from plain how things would stand with appreciation. Even granting the 
thumbtack itself was beneath appreciation, it would not follow that an artwork 
materially like a mere thumbtack could not be appreciated; and that to which we 
might respond appreciatively would be the properties of the artwork without 
neces.sariJy being the properties of the thumbtack. To be sure the connection be· 
tween the two may be very intricate to work out indeed - as intricate perhaps as 
the connection between a person and his body. We may see this somewhat more 
clearly perhaps by pondering the notorious example of Duchamp's FountaJ!!_, and 
Dickie's own analysis of it. 
Dickie iis adamant in insisting that there is no such thing as "a special kind of 
aesthetic consciousness, attention, or perception." And he goes om to say that "The 
only sense in which there is a difference between the appreciation of art and the 
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appreciation of nonart is that the appreciations have different objects." Presumably 
he dQe$ not mean by "different objects" the difference between artworks and mere 
things, for then his definition would go circular: he would be defining appreciation 
of art in terms of its objects, whereas candidacy for appreciation was supposed to 
have gone into the explanation of why something is an artwork. So I gather he is 
trying to say that what we appreciate in artworks is just what we would appreciate 
in non-artworks, when in fact they happen materially to be the same, as Fountain 
is with countles.5 many urinals distributed for the convenien« or gentlemen where­
ever they congregate. "Why," Dickie says, "cannot the ordinary qualities of Foun­
tain - �ts gleaming white surface, the depth revealed when it reflects images of 
;;;.;ounding objects, its pleasing oval shape - be appreciated? It has qualities simi­
lar to those or works by Brancusi and Moore which many do not balk at saying 
they appreciate." Th� !!!. qualities of the urinal in question, as they are qualities 
of any urinal made of white porcelain, and which do resemble certain qualities of 
Bird in Flight. But the question is whether the artwork Fountain is indeed identical 
with that urinal, and hence whether those gleaming surfaces and deep reflections 
are indeed qualities of the artwork at all. Ted Cohen has supposed that Duchamp's 
work is not the urinal .at all but the gesture of exhibiting it, and the gesture, if that 
indeed is the work, has no gleaming surfaces to speak of, and differs from what 
Moore and Brancusi did roughly as gestures differ from bits of brass and bronze. 
But the work, whatever it is, itself has properties that urinals themselves lack, it is 
daring, �mpudent, irreverent, witty, and clever and mere urinals are none of these. 
What would have provoked Duchamp to madness or murder, I should think, would 
be the s�ght of aesthetes mooning over the gle.aming surfaces of the porcelain object 
he had manhandled into exhibition space: "How like Kilamanjaro! How like the 
white radiance of Eternity! How artically sublime!" (Bitter laughter at the Cl!-!� 
des �i:!�s.tes.) No: the properties of the object deposited in the artworld Et shares 
with most i�mz of inrtustrial porcelainerie, while the properties t'c..uui.Jin, �ts �n 
artwork, po!:�esses, it shares with the Julian Tomb of Michaelangelo and the Great 
Perseus of Cellini. If what made Fountain an artwork were all and only the qualities 
it shared with urinals, the question would arise as to what makes it an artwork and 
not those. Is it just an oversight of the artworld? Should there be a mass transfig. 
uration like a mass conversion to Buddhism of all the untouchables in Calcutta? 
I take the responsibility: herewith all the urinals in Greater New York along with 
those in Wichita are artworks! I shall get around to those in Baton Rouge and Okla· 
homa City when time permits. What Dickie has overlooked is an ambiguity in the 
term "makes" as it occurs in the question: What makes something a work of art? 
He has emphasized how something gets to be a work of art, which may be institu­
tional, and neglected in favor of aesthetic considerations the question of what 
qualities constitute an artwork once something is one. 
My own view is that a work of art has a great many qualities, indeed a great 
many qualities of a different sort altogether, than the qualities which belong to 
objects materially indJscemible from them but not themselves artworks. And some 
of these qualities· may very well be aesthetic ones, or qualities one can experience 
aesthetically or find "worthy and valuable." But then in order to respond aesthetic­
ally to these ooe must first know the object is an artwork, and hence the distinction 
between what is art md what is not is presumed available before the difference in 
response to that difference in identity is possible. Aristotle had an insight that the 
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pleasure one derives from works of mimesis presupposes knowledge that they are 
imitations, for one �ill not derive that pleasure from the originals, however indis· 
cemible originals and imitations may be. And Diderot has brilliantly argued that we 
may be moved to tears by representations of things which by themsel"es will move 
us not at all, or move us differently. We may cry at a representation of a mother's 
despair at the death of a child: but he would be hard·hearted who just wept at the 
correspondant reality: the thing is to comfort and console. What I shall proceed to 
argue, then, is that there are two orders of aesthetic response, depending upon whet­
her the response is to an artwork or to a mere real thing which cannot be told apart 
from it. Hence we cannot appeal to aesthetic considerations in order to get our 
definition of art, inasmuch as we need the definition of art in order to identify the 
sorts of aestheitic responses appropriate to works of art in contrast with mere real 
things. True, something may not be a work of art without, as Dickie says, the mini· 
mal potential for aesthetic value: but I wonder if there is anything at all of which 
that is not true? He himself allows, against Cohen, that "thumbtacks, envelopes, 
and plastic forks have qualities that can be appreciated if one makes the effort to 
focus on them." So what cannot? Yet there is, I shall argue, a special aesthetics for 
works of art: indeed there is a special language of artistic appreciation; and inas­
much as both seem to be involved with the concept of art, it will not be amiss to 
.address ourselves to some features of aesthetic and thence of artistic experience, 
even if it will not especially help us in finding the definition of art. 
It will be an analytical convenience to begin by supposing, even if false, that 
there exists, just as a great many philosophers of merit have believed there to exist, 
an aesthetic sense, or a sense of beauty, or a faculty of taste; and that it is (or these 
are) as widely distributed among men as the so-called external senses, like sight and 
hearing, are. I should suppose them more widely distributed even than that, for 
there must be as much reason to suppose animals are driven by aesthetic preferen­
ces as that men are, and that if they are, there is evidence that we are dealing with 
something innate. I should on the other hand be astonished were someone to pro· 
pose that there is an innate "sense of art" - it would be like supposing there some 
special sense, wired.in, for telling which were the baroque churches. There is more 
to the matter even than this, I think. Whatever the occasional commendat-0ry force 
of "work of art,11 it is plausible to suppose that it is after all a matter of fact whet­
her something is a work of art or not. But it would beg every relevant philosophical 
question there is, to suppose that it is a matter of fact that certain things have 
.aesthetic value in worthiness, or that arguments over the aesthetic merits of some· 
thing can be settled remotely by appeal to the sort of evidence pertinent to wheth· 
er something is a work of art or not. It is not clear, for example, taking "is beauti· 
ful" as the paradigm aesthetic predicate, whether "!..is beautiful" has descriptive 
meaning or not, in the sense of being true or false. Perhaps the sentences which use 
this predicate at all belong to a kind of ncn-cognitive discourse, and are used simply 
to express feelings towards the objects designated: perhaps we do not characterize 
objects but coo, as it were, in their presence by means of such language as this. In· 
deed, there is a structure of controversy available in connection with aesthetic 
language which, not surprisingly, exactly matches that available in connection with 
the language of ethics. Obviously, not all possible positions are compatible with 
the claim that there is an aesthetic sense, as not all positions in the meta-linguistics 
of morals would be compatible with the claim that there ls a moral sense. So we 
7 
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had better ponder somewhat carefully what sort of sense the sense or beauty is. if 
indeed t!Pere is such a sense. In the end, having a sense of beauty will certain!>· 
differ from having a nose for art. But let us press on. 
Whether such a sense ought to be understood on the model of the sense of 
sight, or whether it might rather be more like the sense oC humor, which is also wide· 
ly enough distributed that its absence in an individual is deplored, merits a pre­
liminary scrutiny. It may of course, be argued that we do not in fact have two 
models, and that the sense of humor is not at all different 'from the sense of sight, 
or that it differs from it only in the way in which, say, the sense of hearing does, so 
that we are dealing with mere additions to the ordinary repertoire of the 'five 
senses'. We have, here, as it were, a sixth andl seventh sense. Thus it is true that the 
sense of taste and the sense or humor are capable of education a.nd refinement: but 
then it may be countered that the sense of sight itself can be trained to make finer 
and finer discriminations, as can the sense of taste for which the aesthetic sense of 
taste is a natural metaphor. In none of these cases can education make good an ini· 
tial deficiency: you cannot teach the blind to see, but rather you must re-equip 
them, or again, it may be argued that the senses of taste and humor are culturally 
conditioned, so that people of a given tribe, for instance, lfind hysterically funny 
thin� which appall us, like the death throes of a wounded antelope; and it is notor· 
ious that there are people who find aesthetically valuable things which offend and 
repel us: exaggerated earlobes, tiny feet, immense lips, huge scars, and ponderous 
bellies. But it may be ieountered - and is - that even color-predicates vary from 
tribe to tribe and culture to culture, so that differences erected upon this basis 
amount to very little. 
These surface parallels notwithstanding. I believe there is a difference between 
these models deep enough to make a difference in our understanding of the mooteci 
aesthetic sense, and though not altogether central to our task, it will not be a rank 
digression to explain wherein the difference seems to me to lie. It lies in the fact 
that the sense of humor consists in part at least in responding to certain things be­
cause they are amusing or comical or funny. Laughter, when at a thing or act be· 
cause the thing or act is comical, is a good enough example of what I mean by a 
response, though of course there are other modes of response. But there is more to 
the matter than just this: having a sense of !humor affects ones life globally: one 
does not take everything tragically or seriously or earnestly: one looks on the light 
side: one mutes misfortune with jokes: having a sense of humor is almost like hav­
ing a philosophy. Something of the same sort is true of the aesthetic sense, as indeed 
It is true of the moral sense, there being as much justification for postulating it as 
either of the others. "Minds in which the transformation of nature were mirrored 
without any emotion," Santayana supposes in The Sense of Beauty, would have no 
moral sense: "For the existence of good in any form, it is not merely consciousness 
but emotional consciousness that is needed. Observation will not do, appreciation 
Is required." But the fact of responsivenes.s is built into the c-0ncept of emotion, and 
it would be difficult to know what moral life would be like, or if indeed there could 
be such a thing as a moral life, if there were not responses like indignation, concern, 
shame, sympathy, and many others. And this contrast between observation and 
appreciation is certainly part of what Wittgenstein must mean when he claims that 
values are not in the world. If they were, he argues, they would be of no value, im· 
plying that we do not simply note that something is valuable ("observation will 
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not do"): values involve a relationship between oursel,·es and tbe world, though 
there may be a natural tendency to project these responses back onto thf' world 
and think of them as though they were there, as Santayana supposes beauty lo be 
the objectification of the pleasure which things elicit in us when we respond to 
them as beautiful. 
It seems to me that responsiveness does not go with the so-called fi\'e senses. 
Thus it is true that a man may respond to certain things he sees as red. the way a 
bull is said to do: but the response may be due less to the fact that the object is 
sensed as red than to the fact that red makes him angry: and anger� the sort of 
thing whose essence comprises responses, like lunging violently or expressing irras· 
cibility. It is ai possible philosophical position to argue that anger simply is a set or 
responses; not some inner state separate from them. But only an extreme verifica· 
tionism would hold that this is true of sensing red. When I say, for example, that 
having a sense of humor entails responding to things because they are funny, I am 
not trying to impose an epistemological criterion, not trying to answer the question 
of how we know that someone is amused. Whatever the reasons for supposing the 
sense of humor to consist in a set of responses, such a theory would be far less 
radical than one in which the sense of red is defined in such terms as saying "Red" 
when presented with the epistemologists red patch. "Mirroring the transformations 
of nature" is a natural and suitable metaphor for minds equipped solely with the 
five senses. 
An area of animal response which bears comparison with the aesthetic sense -
or the sense of humor - is that of sexual response. The Erotics is the unwritt.en 
aristotelian masterpiece The Poetics cries out for as a companion volume. To find 
something sexually exciting is not passively to register the fact that it is so, but is 
rather to be aroused, and it is difficult to imagine that someone could be aroused 
without responding in the familiar physical ways: to be aroused just is to respond 
those ways. There may seem to be a difference in the fact that sexual response is 
not disinterested: to respond sexually is to want to possess sexually, whereas it 
has been widely held that the aesthetic sense is disinterested, and is content w1th 
mere contemplatiort. But this thought may derive from the fact that certain para· 
digms are used with regard to which no serious alternative to contemplation may be 
available - like sunsets. But wanting to paint or photograph - or to remember -
these things is not misleadingly thought of as a way of possessing them; and though 
one cannot own a sunset, the history of taste and the history of acquisitiveness run 
pretty much together, and men are pleased enough to claim ownership of the beau­
ties of the world. Indeed, attempting to possess may be one form of aesthetic 
response, as laughter is of the sense of humor. 
Each of these examples, but none of the ordinary senses, admits of perver­
sion, conspicuously so in the sexual dimension, but no less so, ultimately, in mattr 
-
ers of taste and humor and moral conduct. Perverse preferences are different from 
bad ones: preverse sex is not bad sex - it may be marvelous - and In contrast with 
bad taste, perverse taste may be the mark of high if miscarried refinement. But I 
have no idea what a perverted sense of hearing could amount to. When someone 
sees green where we see red. this is color-blindness, not chromatic perversion. 
The concept of perversion, of course, carries enough of a connotation of 
normative judgment, however finally It is to be analyzed, that there seems room for 
the application of imperatives: there are things to which we respond to which we 
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feel we ought not to respond, and things to which we ought to respond which we 
cannot: there is a k.ind of aesthetic weakness as there is of moral weakness - as 
there is for the matter a kind of emotional akrasia. But none or this again is true or 
the ordinary senses, which traditionally at least would have been regarded as not 
subject to the intervention of the will. AJI of this is consistent with regarding the 
aesthetic sense as innate (sexuality certainly is), but my main interest in drawing 
the distinction does not lie here. It lies, rather. in the fact, if lam correct, that no 
knowledge of an object can make it look different, that an object retains its sensory 
qualities unchanged however it is classed and whatever it may be called. A rose is 
alleged to smell as sweet by whatever name it is called. To put it in a more contem­
porary idiom, ones sensory experiences would not be expected to undergo altera­
tion with changes in the description of the object: that remains invariant under 
changes in description, as Santayana's useful it philosophically tendentious image 
of a 'mirroring intelligence' implies. If the aesthetic sense were like the other senses, 
the same, one would surmise, would be true of it, but in fact ones aesthetic respon· 
ses are often a function of what ones beliefs about an object are, or the description 
under which the object i; given. �. there may be c&s where my sensory experience 
of an object may differ when the object is brought under a certain description, in 
the sense that knowing it to be of a certain kind, or knowing it to be described in 
that way, I may concentrate attention and pick up certain qualities I missed the 
first time around. Told that a certain wine has the taste of raspberries, I may learn 
to discriminate this taste which I did not discern when I first tasted it. Yet it was 
there to be tasted before as well as after it has been described that way: the object 
did not acquire these qualities by being described, nor did it change its status there­
by. But the qualities an object has when an artwork are in fact so different from 
what an indiscernible counterpart has when a mere real thing that it is absurd to 
suppose I missed these qualities in the latter. They were not there to� missed. No 
sensory examination of an object will tell me that it is an artwork, since quality 
for quality it may be matched by an object which is not one, so far at least the 
qualities to which the normal senses are responsive are concerned. If aesthetic re­
sponse were constant as the difference between art and non-art, the same would 
be true of these. But in fact it is false. Our aesthetic responses will differ depending 
upon which it is because the qualities to which we respond are different. 
I do not simply mean, even if it is incidentally true, that our attitude toward 
an object may alter when we discover it to have been artwork. We may,, upon 
learning that an artwork is before us, adopt an attitude of respect and awe. We may 
treat the object differently, as we may treat differently what we took to be an old 
derilict upon discovering him to be the pretender to the throne, or treat with res­
pect a piece of wood described as from the true cross when we were about to use it 
for Jtindling. These chang:es indeed are "institutional" and social in character. Learn­
ing something to be an artwork, we may, just as Dicltie says, attend to its gleaming 
surfaces or whatever. But if what we attend to could have been attended to !before 
the transfiguration, the only change will have been adoption of an aesthetic stance, 
which •could in principle have stru"ck before. It ls a matter merely ot attending to 
v.ht W86 there to be perceived - like the taste of raspberries in the glass of gigondas. 
No: learning it is a work of art means that it has qualities to attend to which its 
untransfigured counterparts just lacked; and that our aesthetic responses will be 
different. And this is not institutional, it is ontological. We are dealing with an alto-
10 
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gether different order of things. 
I I 
It is not difficult to construct examples in which this difference may be made 
plain, examples in which recognitionally indiscriminable objects prcve to have very 
different qualities and indeed very different structures depending upon whether 
one of them is an artwork OT not. Even if there is an innate aesthetic sense, the 
aesthetic responses will differ, even in the same individual, depending upon how the 
indiscernible objects are classed. The differences are as deep as those between bodi· 
ty movements and actions, between a person and a zombie, between a divinity and 
an idol. 
Imagine s·ix panels of ricepaper, used in the Japanese manner as a room divid· 
er, say in an apartment in Tokyo, a city whose air quality has degenerated alarm· 
ingly over recent years. Soot ha> been deposited on the roof which, one day, springs 
a leak in such a way that splot<:hes and splashes and drips of soiled water get depos­
ited in various irregular patterns while the apartment stands empty. 'The new tenant, 
an aesthete, suffers aesthetic recoil upon beholding the sordid sight: he demands 
removal and re.placement with some nice clean panels, so the place "is fit to live 
in." Whereupon he is informed that a rare screen, six panels wide, by one of th·e 
great masters of the art, has come onto the market; that it would fit the space to 
perfection; that it is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. It is bought and installed and 
it is absolutely thrilling to look at it. To be SUI'@, the same distribution of greys and 
blacks may be found as defaced its merely domestic predecessor, and for our pur­
poses the panels in fact are exactly congruent. These blacks, however, are moun­
tains, those grey smudges clouds. The fine splatterings in the panel to the extreme 
right compose a token representation of rain softening into mists. The irregular 
streak over here is a dragon �cending, at times indistinguishable Crom the moun­
tains, at others from the clouds, making his mysterious way - Way - through the 
boundless, softly articulated universe to whatever is its destiny and our own. It is a 
philosophical work, dense with depth and mystery and beauty: before it one is 
moved to the profoundest meditations: one is transfigured by its power - though 
its indistinguishable counterpart rightly provokes us only to revulsion and disgust. 
Our aesthete spends hour upon hour in contemplation of its bottomless wonder, 
now and again shuddering at the recollection of the desecration it replaced. Those 
dirty panels had no mystery and certainly no depth and absolutely no beauty. They 
were ugly beyond description. 
It may be argued that the example is unfair. There may be a Japanese artist 
concerned with an oriental version of l'art brut. Flinging an epithet against the 
entire rotten preciosity of a decadent feudal tradition, he presents us with six pan­
els of filthy rice paper, as offensive as bird-droppings on one of Guido's angel-struck 
maidens. It is nothing more than it pretends to be: so many stretches of soiled 
rice paper. Will it be beautiful, mysterious, cosmic, deep? I have no idea what 
aesthetic qualities it will have, for the object is insufficiently described and I cannot 
tell much from the small reproduction in Art International. 1 know that my respon­
ses to it will be different from those the great screen elicits. This work, I imagine 
will be described by connoiseurs as "sordid," without this being necessarily or at 
all an expression of disgust or even ot aesthetic dispraise. And I am certain that the 
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logic of this expression's use 'ti.ill be different when applied as a artistic predicate. 
true or an art work, than an aesthetic predicate true or a mere sordid thing. And it 
will go with quilt: different responses as well. I can do no more al this point in the 
present anaJysis than indicate that there is this difference, and to commit myself to 
work it out when I am in better position to map the semantics of the Language of 
Artistic Appreciation. But when I say that the ob ject has been insufficiently descri· 
bed, I mean that a number of decisions must be made in idenltifying it as a work­
decisions which do not come up at all in connection with its recognitionaJly con­
gruent cousin, the long-since discarded set of soiled panels. Meanwhile how agree· 
able to have established that whatever the divisions between East and West, the 
identicaJ philosophico·aesthetic questions can be raised for either tradition! 
I I I 
The two Japanese artworks just described - the Great Screen and its photo· 
graphicaJly indiscernible counterpart of l'art brut japonais, have a kind of common 
denominator - a base as it were - supporting variable superstructures but which, 
in counter·marxistic fashion, underdetermines the structures which share it . What 
they have in common may be thought to be simply everything that is congruent 
with the mere reaJ object - in this case the soiled screen - i t  has been a constant 
philosophical chaJlenge to differentiate them from. My claim throughout is that an 
artwork cannot be flattened onto its base and identified just with it, for then l! 
would be what the mere thing itself is - a square of red canvas, a dirty set of rice· 
paper sheets, or whatever. It would be whatever the real thing itself consisted in 
that one might propose to subtract from the work of art, in order to see what the 
remainder might be, if any, supposing that the essence of art might lie here. It was 
as though the artwork in every instance was a complex entity with a set of rice 
paper sere.ens as a proper and indeed an easily interchangeable part. 
But now there has come up the first shadow of a set of questions which will 
lengthen as our analysis advances, and which casts a certain darkness over the, so to 
speak, wittgensteinian subtraction. Is every part and quality of that material base, 
is every sensory quality which remains invariant under the shift from thinghood to 
artwork, or from artwork to artwork, indeed a part or quality of the work itselr? 
And if not can we so much as say that the work containsl!, viz., with 'aJl its quaJi­
ties and parts?' IC the answer in fact is negative, small wonder that what we took as 
base underdetermines the set of artworks which have it as a seeming common base! 
For if the work determines which parts and qualities of the bases belong to it, it 
might be possible to imagine cases in which no material parts and qualities are 
shared by works whose photographs exactly resemble one another, or which to all 
intents and purposes are totally similar under sensory scrutiny. And the complex­
ity of the artworks accordingly renders virtually useless the subtraction formula 
inasmuch as until the work is identified, there is no telling what is to be subtracted. 
Let u; consider a fairly straightforward case. There is at Columbia University's 
Arden House Conference Center a statue of a cat in bronze. It stands on a floor at 
the head of a stairway which leads into a commonroom at a lower level. Presum· 
ably it is of some value, or believed to be of some value, inasmuch as the managers 
have chained it to the railing - to forstall theft, I suppose, as though it were a tele­
vision set in a squalid motel. Such would be at least the obvious interpretation. But 
12 11
Danto: Aesthetic Responses and Works of Art
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1981
Arthur Danto 
I am open to the suggestion that it is not a chained sculpture or a cat but a sculpture 
or a chained cat, one end or which is wittily attached to a piett or reality (a chain 
from art to reality is what we have been looking for!). or course what �!..take to 
be a bit or reality can in fact be part or the work, which is now a sculpture of a cat· 
chained-to-an-iloo-railing - though the moment we allow !! to be a part or the work, 
where does or can the work end? It becomes a kind or metaphysical sandpit, 
swallowing the universe down into itself! In any case, suppose we have just cat-cum· 
chain. The question is what is to be subtracted, if anything'? ls the chain part or the 
work or not? Are the scratches part or the work or defacements or it? Metaphy.si· 
cians have studied the reasons why a chained object is in fact two objects and not 
one, correctly surmising that we cannot draw up a basic ontology until we know 
where such lines are to be drawn. The intuition is that there are two things, the 
boundaries bewng where common sense would draw them. But whatever the diffi· 
cult conclusion may be, all rules are in abeyance with works of art: cat and chain 
can be parts of a single work, though different objects outside the world of art. Nor 
is the problem purely a contrived one. A piece by Richard Serra was exhibited in a 
show of contemporary sculpture at the Museum of Modem Art in June of 1979. It 
was called Comer Pie<'e, and chiefly it was a metal bar which stood to two walls as 
a hypoteneuse to two sides, perdendicular to the floor. Beneath it was a lead plate. 
The piece was located in the center of a large gallery, and there was a special comer 
built there, in the middle of the room, in which the bar could be seen. The question 
which faces the viewer is whether the corner itself is part of Comer-Piece? Or must 
the owner furnish his own corner, as he must furnish his own wall if he wants to 
hang a painting? What would one be getting for one's money when one buys Cor­
ner-Piece? As with a frozen pie, one must look at the label to find out what the 
artwork here contains, which as it happens is "Lead plate and lead wrapped around 
steel core." Thereupon one erases from scrutiny the factitious comer constructed 
by MOMA for its cherished acquisition. 
There are Tintorettos where the coarse canvas is so in evidence, as he was a 
rough and hurried painter, that standing at museum distance it is very difficult to 
overlook it, or ta sublate it in order simply to concentrate on The Miracle of 
Loaves and Fishes. ls the canvas to be read out? I suppose it is, but the question 
ought not to be answered lightly - think of the bottom edge or ithe Entombment 
of Saint Petronilla. There are some paintings I once saw by the second generation 
Abstract Expressionist, Joseph Stefanelli, where the canvas is specified as being 
allowed to breath through the paint, where it is intended not simply as support ror 
the swags of paint but struggles, as it were, with the paint for identity and a kind 
of artistic Lebensraum: it is part of the work, and this is so even for the areas which 
do ·not succeed in coming through. I shall speak in a moment of the logic here, but 
for now, and at the level of a slogan, we might simply say that a decision must be 
made as to what the work is before we can tell what mus,t be subtracted. 
Beyond this, there is a question of whether we are dealing with one work or 
more, which have been mistakenly read together. Two works of the gifted Eva 
Hesse were shown in the same show as Corner-Piece. The two indeed were in a 
single alcove. One consisted in a set of irregular cylinders made of fiberglass, which 
were set in a kind of congretation on the noor of the alcove. The other was a 
sort of curved wire which went from floor to wall in a striking curve: there were 
pieces of some unidentifiable stuff attached to the curve at what appeared to be 
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somewhat random intervaJs. When I spied the alcove, I saw what I thought was a 
single work with two main components, rather than two distinct works shown 
together by curatorial decision. Were it a single work, there would be a witty con­
trast between the soaring curve and the squat herd of dopy cylindroids. It could 
almost be a political allegory. Alas, the only contrast is between the two works, 
Viculum Two, made of rubberized wire mesh and wire, and Repititions 19 made 
of fiberglass. Nor is this a problem simply with the extreme avant-garde art of our 
time. There is a painting in Santa Maria del Popolo in Rome, of a saint with eyes 
turned up in what appears to be an exaggerated baroque rapture. We, who prefer 
things� are revolted by this, especially when it goes with clasped hands: it is as 
cloying as Carlo Dolci or, for the matter, Keane. Leo Steinberg turns everything 
round through his discovery that the painting is a fragment of the chapel's decora­
tion: there was shown a miracle on the ceiling, since disappeared: and the saint was 
looking at it. And �� were looking at a piece of a work and not a work, and 
accordingly judged it wrong. Example after example can be given, but let us return 
to our theorizing. 
The relationship between the work and its materiaJ substrate is as intricate 
as that between mind and body. Or, following Strawson, with his distinction be­
tween P-predicates and M-predicates, it is as though there were properties of the 
work exemplifying W-predicates - and properties of the mere things which is ret­
inally indjscemible from the work - 0-predicates - where there is the task, which 
may vary from item to item in an arrayed example, of determining which 0-predi­
cates are aJso W-predicates, and which not. Thus "is chained" may be true of the ob· 
ject - that piece of shaped bronze - without. being true of the cat. And when it is 
true of the cat, its logical status, as we shall see, is going to differ markedly from 
that same preclicate when true of the object. Again, 'of something chained' is true 
of the work, but not of the subject of the work, and certainly not of the material 
counterpart. It is as though the distinction between artworks and mere real things 
reappears as a distinction between the language used to describe works and the 
language of mere things. Until one has constituted the work, as the Phenomenolo· 
gists use that expression, to what is one responding aesthetically, and will It after 
all be the right thing and the right response? 
Let us now speak of the mere thing, various parts and properties of which will 
be parts and properties of the artworks which compose the other members of a 
given arrayed example, as the material counterpart of any of th�se. It will not mere­
ly be that the work itself will determine what of the material counterpart will have 
to be subtracted: the works will in the nature of the case have properties which 
are not properties of the material counterpart. It is finally for this sort of reason 
that I am reluctant to admit without demur the entities Professor Cohen proffers 
as counterinstances to Dickie's thought that an artwork is a candidate for apprecia­
tion. As � objects, thumbtacks may have little to recommend themselves aes­
thetically. But as artworks'? Suppose there is an artwork whose material counter­
part is a mere thumbtack. It will, as we shall see, have properties to which response 
is appropriate which willl not be the properties of the latter, if only the property 
of being about somethilng. It will have a structure it would be fallacious to attri­
bute to thumbtacks. Until I have constituted the work, of course, which may take 
into consideration some fairly serious arthistoricaJ and artphilosophical investiga. 
tion, nothing can be said. I am not here going to say what my response would be: 
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familiar as 1 am .,..;th thumbtacks, 1 ha\'e yet to st'e' a work whose material counter· 
part is one. And a work whose material countf>rpart consists of three thumbtacks 
may have abysses of meaning· to which the appropriate aesthetic responses might be 
a retigio-cosmic shudder! For the moment, however, my concern is only to point 
out the possibility of differential aesthetic responses depending upon whether we 
are dealing with an artwork or its material counterpart. We now know. of course. 
that anything in the world, and any combination of things in the world, can be 
material counterpart to artworks without it following that a number of artworks 
will equal the number of things and combinations of things in the world. Think 
o( how many peers a mere red square of can\'as has: poor John Stuart Mill worried 
himself into a st.ate of nineteenth century blues at the fact that then' were just so 
many tones and combinations of tones, and so the musical combinations possible 
would be finite and sooner or tater would be run th rough and music would come to 
an end. As though the relationship between musical composition and tones and 
combinations of tones would be all that different from the relationship betwE-en 
works of art and their material counterparts: music is not interestingly finite at ell. 
I V  
There are doubtless works of art, even quite great works of art, which have 
material counterparts that are beauti ful : and they are beautiful in ways in which 
certain natura!l objects would be counted as beautiful: gemstones, birds, sunsets: 
things to which persons of any degree of aesthetic sensitivity might respond, and 
this perhaps antecedently to any aesthetic education. Perhaps this is dangerous to 
suppose: sailors might respond to sunsets only i n  terms of what they foretell of 
coming weather; peasants might be indifferent to the flowers they tramp on; there 
may be no objects to which everyone must respond which can be offered as para­
digm cases. Nevertheless, let us suppose a group of people who do in fact respond 
to just the things we would in fact offer as paradigms: to fields of daffodils, lo min­
erals, to peacocks, to glowing irridescent things which appear to house their own 
light, and which elicit from these people, as they might from us, the almost invol· 
untary expression "How beautiful !" They would partition off beautiful things just 
as we would. Except these happen to be barbarians, lacking a concept of art. Now 
we may suppose these barbarians would, as we do, respond to certain works of art 
as well as to natural objects just as we would - but they would do so only to those 
works of art whose material counterparts are beautiful, simply becausE' they see 
works of art as we would see those material counterparts - as beautiful thin25. 
Like the rose-windows of Chartres, or thirteenth century stained glass generality; 
certain works in enamel; works in virtu; confections wrought by grecian goldsmiths; 
the saltcellar of Cellini; the sorts of things collected by the Medici and the later 
Habsburghs - cameos, ornaments, precious and semi-precious stones, things in lace 
and filagree; things luminous and airy, possession of which would be like possess· 
ing a piece of the moon when that was thought to be a pure radiance rather than a 
ranch of rocks. There is some deep reason, I am certain, why these things attract, 
but I shall forego any jungian rhapsodizing. 
There is little doubt why the Old Masters warm the heart. It Is through the 
fact they capture the sort of inner light that true gems possess: their paintings have 
a light in addition to whatever light they show. Daubers may manage to show light, 
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but their paintings ha\·e only the luminosity or mud. My personal criterion or great 
painting has in part to do with this mystery of light, but I wo:nder how man�· of the 
great pajntings of the world would be seen that way, in po�s ion of this curious 
grace, if they were perceived solely as wt might perceh·e their material counterparts: 
would their material counterparts have light, granted they might not show any eith· 
er'! Think or some great drawing, and then imagine it as seen by you when seized 
by a ltind of pictorial dyslexia, hence as so many splotches and smudges and scrat­
ches and puddles. It would be to look at those drawings perhaps as the theory of 
formalism would enjoin us always to look at everything artistic. But to the degree 
that the imperative makes sense, the beauty of the work may vanish when the work 
is reduced to its material counterpart, or replaced by it as a princess by a change­
ling. Indeed, the demand that the beauty of the work be identical with the beauty 
of the material counterpart is virtually a definition of barbaric taste, magnificently 
exemplified in the goldwork of the Scythians. But a work with a beautiful material 
count�rpart could just be �  as a work. 
Imagine now our sensitive barbarians sweeping across the civilized world, 
conquering and destroying like Huns. As barbarians reserve the fairest maidens for 
their violent beds, we may imagine these sparing for their curious delectation just 
those works of art which happen to have beautiful material counterparts. Some 
paintings, certainly, will survive. Those with lots of gold leaf will certainly do so, 
and certain icons with highly ornamented frames. Or paintings where the colors 
have a kind of hard mineral brilliance, as in Crivelli or perhaps Mantegna. But how 
many Rembrandts would make it through under this criterion, how many Watteaus 
or Chardins or Picassos? Appreciation of these requires them to be perceived first 
as artworks, and hence presupposes availability of the concept which we are dis· 
allowing the subjects of this Gedankenexperiement. It is not that aesthetics is irrel­
evant to art, but that the relationship between the artwork and its material counter· 
part be gotten right for aesthetics to have any bearing, and though there may be an 
innate aesthetic sense, the cognitive apparatus required for it to come into play 
cannot itself be considered innate. Let me endeavor to illustrate this with one of 
the marvelous sorts of examples the contemporary artworld makes available to the 
philosopher. 
Let us consider at this point some remarkable paintings by Roy Lichtenstein, 
his Brushstroke paintings of the late 1960's. These are paintings of brushstrokes, 
and one who is aware of the role that brushstrokes played in the New York School 
of Abstract Expressionism in the 1950's cannot but see Lichtenstein's paintings as 
comments upon that movement. The brushstroke lay at the logical intersection of 
two concerns with paint. The first concern was with the phy:sicality of paint itself, 
as a substance out of which paintings had always been made, but which was some· 
how disguised by painters, who sublated it in favor of some subject: returning to 
the physicality of painting was somewhat in the spirit of a modernist revulsion 
against the victorian suppression of the flesh, as in Lawrence, who came with a 
kind of prophetic urgency to announce that we are flesh in just the way in which 
the Abstract Expressionist wishes to announce the paintings are paint. So he used 
it thickly, and eschewed the transfigurations of it  which images and subjects always 
Induced: substance and subject were one. Since paint was the subject, an artist was 
a painter and the basic artistic action was painting (not: copying, imitating, repre· 
sentlng, stating, but: painting). The artist, as in famous descriptions by Harold Ros-
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enberg, uses the canvas as an arena, he makes upon it a swipe of painting which 
means nothing ulterior and is what it is about. Well, it is of coul'St" true that paint­
ing is an action. but so is sketching. and so too are copying. repre-senting. and the 
like: but this was a puritanical movement and concerned with the most basic artis· 
tic action there is: and while representing and copying and the rest all entailed 
painting, painting entailed none of these, and so was fundamental: and just think 
of what sort of metaphysics one has to have internalized in order to want to get 
down to basics: it is a metaphysics of basics and non basics, complicated by a moral 
attitude that only the basics matter, everything else being hypocracy. A straight 
line, one would think, would be basic in some deep geometrical sense, but lines are 
too easily seen as generating forms, and hence as having a repre-sentational role 
incipiently: so the thing was to use strokes of paint. heavy and fat. laid down with 
as big a brush as one could manage in as large a sweep as one could execute, a 
stroke so consumatory that thie question of what one was doing through the stroke 
could hardly arise: there was no way of getting the stroke to form part of an image. 
it stood alone, it was what it was: thou�h De Kooning's contribution may in part 
have been that even these wildly anarchistic strokes, which seemed to be, like a 
thoreauvian ma\•srick, unintegrable into a representational structure, could in fact 
be regimented to form images of - of all things! - women. Not venuses and mad­
onnas or Mme Benoirs, but paint-ladies of an almost ferocious character, like some· 
one who resents having been given existence. But we disgress. 
The entity which concentrated and emblemized this complex of attitudes 
was the drip: drips acquired a kind of mystical exaltation of status in the ninetttn 
fifties, and it is easy to see why. In an earlier period, a drip would be an accident or 
a blemish, a sign of ineptitude (an attitude charmingly reinvented by the "Masters" 
of subway wall grafitti, who have assistants whose purpose is to wipe drips away, 
the Masters having contempt for those who allow the paint to foUow a life of its 
own, which is exactly the innrse of the attitude of the 50's painter). A drip is a 
violation of artistic will, and has no possibility of a representational function, and 
so, when one occurs, as one must have innumerable times, it immediately disfigures 
a picture - as a typographical error disfigures a text - especially when it is the 
function of the medium to disguise itself in favor of what it means to show. There 
traditionally had been a complicity between artist and spectator, in which the latter 
was to disregard the paint and gape at the Transfiguration, while it.he artist, on his 
side, worked to make it an honest possibility for the spectator to do this by making 
the paint as inc,onspicuous as possible (there are exceptions, of course: Rembrandt 
md Valesquez are stunning masters of pigmentational accidentality - and Tintor­
etto refused to cooperate). The drip, meanwhile calls attention Insistently to paint 
as paint: so in the tradition just alluded to, drips would have had the role that static 
does in the transmission of music, supposing It to be the role of acoustical engin· 
eering to make the medium between the source of music and the ear of the listener 
as transparent as the physics allows. So someone who wanted to call attention to 
the tl"lnscriptional aspect of contemporary audition would celebrate static as a 
�k of integrity, to be heard ni.ther than listened through. Drips then are monu· 
ments to accident, spontaneity, giving the paint its own life, so much so that it 
could almost have been supposed that the function of painting was to provide an 
occasion !or drips; and Pollack was himself celebrated for having discovered the 
drip, which at the time was regarded as on a par with Columbus' discovery of 
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America or Freud's of the Unconscious. More important, the drip itself is possible 
only when paint itself is nuid, so it not merely underwrites the way paint must be, 
but the way in which it is put on canvas: the dabs of paste laid on with a brush and 
systematically diluted with medium give way to the battery of paint cans and the 
dipstick, as the canvas itself describes a rotation through ninety degrees from its 
vertical position on the easel to its horizontal position of the floor, which the 
painter crouches over like a frog.god. But the drip is also evidence for the urgency 
of the painting act, of pure speed and passion, as the artist swings loops and eccen· 
tric arabesques across the surface, sending up showers and explosions of splatters. 
And since he merely executed the will or the paint to be itself, the arti:;t had ncth· 
ing of his own to say: which went with that studied brutishness of the Dumb Artist 
exemplified over and over again in the artworld of the time by really quite intelli· 
gent men and women who pretended to a kind of autism, and went around in cloths 
splashed so with paint that the very costume was an advertisement for the clos,ene:;s 
with which the artist identified with his work. And the bluejeain and the workshoe 
- how distant from the velour jacket and beret of the time of Whistler! - connoted 
a kind of proletarian honesty and down-to�arthness. In any case, the drip too 
makes an appearance in Lichtenstein's paintings, along with the brush strokes. The 
painting5 show those r<>py, fat, incarnated spontaneity of brushstrokes and drips, 
and wouJd be recognizable as such to anyone familiar with the high period of Tenth 
Street Art. Their iconography is patent, and I have dwelt upon it at length because 
it is absolutely important to understand the subject if we are to "appreciate" the 
way in which it is treat�d. 
The first thing we must note about Lichtenstein's paintings is that they have 
none of the properties associated with what they are of. One would traditionally 
have expected this as a matter of course, since paintings of landscapes have seldom 
the properties of what they show: but it is somewhat remarkable here through the 
fact that these are paintings of painting. These, for example, show brushstrokes but 
do not consist, in their own right, of brushstrokes, and for just the reason the spec­
tator must grasp the discrepancies between what is shown and the way in which it 
is shown, surface and subject being virtually antonymic. The brushstrokes are shown 
in a way in which is inconsistent with what they are in further ways still: they are 
shown imprisoned in heavy black outlines, as in Leger's work or, better, as in a 
child's coloring book. But the brushstrokes these paintings are about were not filled 
into pre-existing boundaries, they were densely swept across the canvas in a single 
impuJsive gesture, defining their own boundaries. By contrast with the free and 
liberated spirit with which those strokes emerged onto their canvases, these strokes 
are shown almost mechanically, almost as though printed onto Lichtenstein's can· 
vases: and indeed, Lichtenstein uses tne Ben Day dots of mechanicaJ reproduction 
processes. So the canvases look like mechanical representations of vitaJ gestures. 
But there is another level still, which we ascend to when we realize that the dots 
were not printed but painted in, each one deposited onto the surface by hands: so 
we have artistic representations of mechanical processes. The monotony of the 
process o( painting these in was somewhat mitigated through the fact that Lichten­
stein uses a lot of students from his classes at Rutgers, and again, I think, the 
knowledge of this history has to be taken as a comment upon the ridiculously 
heroized view of The Artist in the period when brushstrokes meant the opposite of 
what this mode of representing them shows. The interposition of the Ben Day dot 
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has a profound symbolism of its own, inasmuch as it encodes in a way the manner 
in which � percei\·e the major events of our timt>, through the wire service photo­
graph and the tele\"ision screen, so the depiction of the victims of the Vietnam war 
takes on an added dimension of horror when lhe mechanical mode of depiction is 
incorporated � part of the image: for our experiences are modulated through the 
medium which has indeed, in MacLuhan's slogan, gotten to be part, at least, of the 
message. Well, the brushstrokes of the great masters of the l 950's were meant not 
to represent anything, simply to be: fresh created realities. And Lichtenstein has 
treated them as artists have always treated reality, namely as something to put into 
works of art. And thus \rlCtimized, these poor deOated swags stand like specimens 
of something once \"ital in representational works which b<>lie at f'vny point the 
intentions of those painters whose life was defined by squeezing paint out like 
hoses gone mad. These paintings are a minor victory in the battle with reality. If the 
cam•as is indeed the arena in which the battle goes, it has b<>en lost to representa· 
tion in the canvases of Lichtenstein. 
I have dwelt at such length upon Lichtenstein's paintings, in part because 
they are so rich in their utilization of artistic theory: they are about theories they 
also reject, and they internalize theories it is required that anyone who may 
appreciate them must understand, and they allude to yet further theories, ignor· 
ance of which impoverishes ones appreciation of these works. What point could 
there be, for instance, to the dots, were someone to be unaware of the role dots 
play in mechanical reproduction, and to the role of mechanical reproduction in the 
life of our culture? The paintings are points of intersection of so many strands i n  
contemporary culture, that it  would not alone be difficult to imagine what someone 
stranger to our culture could make of them, but, consistently with the form of 
artistic experimentation which has characterized our analysis throughout, it is diffi· 
cult to see what works exactly like these but painted, suppose, in the 1860'i: could 
have meant, much less what would have been an aesthetic response to them, since 
they simply could not, congruence let us say of material correlates notwithstanding, 
constitutes the same, or better, synonymous works of art, supposing those earlier 
ones to satisfy same criterion of being works of art. And our argument has been 
that whatever we are to say about aesthetic responses; it is possible to imagine that 
works with a common material counterpart would elicit very different responses. 
These paintings are deeply witty works, self-conscious to such a degree that it is 
difficult to know how much of the material correlate must be reckoned in as part 
of the artwork, and how much not: � self-<:onscious are they, indeed, that they 
almost exemplify an hegelian ideal in which matter is transfigured into spirit, In 
this case there being hardly an element of the material counterpart which may not 
be a candidate for an element in the work of art it.self. I shall return to a proper 
analysis of this subsequently, but for the present I mean only to stress that what­
ever the counterfactual nineteenth century counterparts to the Lichtenstein paint· 
ings may have been about, they almost could not have been about what the Lich­
tenstein's are about. Even if they were in some mad way about brushstrokes, the 
brushstrokes they were about would not have connoted a set or associations only 
available to those who had, if  not lived through at least known about the dense 
artistic controversies of the 1950's. Of course, those paintings could have been a 
kind of crystal ball through which the art of the future might be glimpsed: but 
what could anyone have made of what they saw there? 
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I am trying to state tha � "'aesthetic object" is OOl � eternally fixed platonic 
entity, a "joy forever" beyond time, space. and history, eternally Lhere for the rapt 
appreciation or connoisseurs. It is not just that appreciation is a function of che 
cognitive location of the aesthete, but that the aesthetic qualities of the work are a 
function of their own hisLoricaJ identity, so that one may have to re,·ise utterly 
ones assessment of a work in the light of what one comes to know about it: it ma�· 
not E'\e'I be the work one thought it was in tihe light of wrong historical information. 
An object of the sort made by Tony Smit!h could have been made almost anytime 
in modem times: at least the material correlate could have been made at any such 
time, but imagine one having been mW in Amsterdam in the 1630's, set down 
where there is no room for its being inserted in the artworld of the times: the gold­
en Age or Jan Steen and Van Goyen: and .it enters that world like the Connecticut 
Yankee the court or King Arthur, or a martian our world. What could it be, what 
could ft be about, if the possibility or its being an artwork so much as could have 
arisen for those whose concept or art consisted in portraits or one another in ruffed 
collars and tables piled up with grapes and oysters and dead rabbits, or peonies with 
a single drop of dew, a convex mirror in which the whole world could be reflected 
as in the Arnolfini wedding portrait. And since, if I am right in supposing that it 
could not be about whatever Tony Smith is about, how could these things have 
had the same structure and syntax, if they had any syntax at all, or any structure 
other than the structure of so many big slabs of black plywood nailed together? 
In Sein WKI Zeit, Hei�gger speaks of ten; as forming a kind of total system - a 
Zeugganzes - which is a complex of interreferential tools not remarkably differ­
ent from a language game, it we follow Wittgenstein in thinking of sentences as 
tools in their own right, to be brought out for various choreographed uses. There 
cannot, thus, just be nails. If there are nails, there have to be hammers to drive 
them and boards to drive them through; and changes at one point in the system en­
tail chianges at other points. You cannot, thus, imagine someone saying that the 
Etruscans were the first to have typewriter ribbons, not even if you find some car· 
boned stretch of silk ribbon at Cervetri, for that, whatever it was, cannot have been 
a typewriter ribbon, oot 4M'l'l if found wound round some bronze wheels which look like 
the spools in a bronze age typewriter: for the whole system has as it were to be 
there at once: paper. metal, keys, etc. Some while ago a cache of Da Vinci manu­
scripts were found which excited cartoonists to make drawings in the davincian 
style of such things as lightbulbs and electric sockets, like a renaissance form of the 
sorts of things we see in drawings by Claes Oldenberg. This is a parody of the idea 
we have of the genius "ahead of his time'� for there are certain ways in which no· 
body can be ahead of his time: a notched bronze wheel exactly like a bicycle sproc­
ket found in excavations in Tibet just could not have been a precocious bicycle 
sprocket, whatever its identity as an artifact. And something like this is true of art ­
works as well: you can certainly have objects - what we have spoken of as the 
material counterparts - at any time in which it was technically, or at least causally 
possible for them to have come into existence: but the works, connected with the 
material counterpart in ways we. have hardily begun to fathom1 are referentially so 
interlocked into their own system of artworks and real things that it is almost 
impossible to think of what might be the response to the same object inserted in 
another time and place. A portrait painted! by a jesuit artist of the favorite concu· 
bine of then emporer of China, which used shadows to round her lovely face, was 
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rejected by her as hideous. since she believed she was being represented as half· 
white, half-black, and that the painting was a joke. e\·en if. to our eyes, it might 
han• rf ralled in sensiti,·ity the Genna Da Benci of U>onardo. A painting by one 
of our contemporary artislS in the style of Giotto simply could not be rt>sponded 
to the way a Giotto could. e.g. to "its touching nai,•ete.' ' not unlE>ss the artist wert' 
ignorant of the history of art and in some miracle of coancidt-nt creation. had rt-­
invented a quattrocento style: and this would bE" like somrone who, in contrast 
with Menard and out of springs of in\'ention one can hardly guess at. wrole out of 
ignorance of the original something we might well consider indiscernibl{' from Don 
Quixote. 
These are by now familiar extensions of Wolfnin 's thought that not l'\'ery· 
thing is possible at e"ery time, and which we have so exploited alt"E'ady. I have re· 
raised these points here becal!Jse we now have at least this piece of theoretical appar­
tus to work with: if we may distinguish between the artwork and its material coun­
terpart - if the material counterpart is whate\ler a work of art may ha\le in common 
with its indiscernible counterpart in reality - then it is possible to imagine two 
works done at very different. times - Lichtenstein's brushstroke painting of 1965 
and an imaged painting exactly like it done in 1865 - which share a material cown· 
terpart but which have to be very distinctive works of art since they cannot con· 
cievably be about the same thing. I have tried to .sketch the intricate tensions be· 
tween subject and surface i n  Lichtenstein's painting, in a partial effort to say what 
they consist in (they consist in part in just these tensions). It cannot be true thal 
whatever the painting of 1865 is about, it is about what Lich tenslein 's is. The 
question before us, accordingly, is what connection there is between the artwork in 
either case and the common material correlate, and this is what I wish to addrPss 
myself to now. It obviously involves something I shall term "interpretation," and 
it is my view that w.bateyer .appreciation may come to, it must i n  some sense be a 
function of interpretation: that in a way is not very different from the slogan in 
the philosophy of science that there are no observations without theories, so in the 
philosophy of art there is no appreciation without interpretation. Interpretation 
consists in determining the relationship between a work of art and its material 
counterparts. But as nothing like this is involved with mere objects, aesthetic res· 
ponse to works of art presupposes a cognitive process response to those mere things 
does not - though the matoor is inevitably complicated by the fact that once the 
distinction is available, and because of the fact that works of art may so closPly 
resemble mere real things, an act of disinterpretation may be required in cases of 
inverse confusion, where we take a mere thing to be a work of art. O f  course there 
may, there doubtless are cases where this is not required: sunsets and the Evening 
Star are properly not regarded as works of art inasmuch as artistic intervention has 
not yet made artworks of things which have sunsets and the Evening Star as mat.er· 
ial counterparts. But the options are available if in fact unexercised. 
In any case, aesthetic response presupposes the distinction and hence cannot 
simply enter into the definition of art. But the matter is deeper than tbat. Aesthe· 
tic appreciation of artworks has a different structure than aesthetic appreciation of 
mere things, however beautiful, and irrespective of whether the sense of beauty is 
innate. It is not a philosophical question, but a psychological one, whether indeed 
there is an innate aesthetic s.ense. What is philosophical is the question of what the 
logic of such appreciation may be, and what the structural differences are between 
responding to artworks and responding to mere things. 
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